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This note discusses methodological issues and practical concerns for international economists 
and international business scholars who apply the gravity equation in their research. The most 
important message of the note is that this equation should correct for multilateral resistance 
factors. We propose a relatively low-cost specification and estimation to implement such 
correction, which is robust in the presence of various endogeneity effects and non-stationary 
variables. In the presence of zero-values in the dataset, however, the multilateral specification 
is best estimated with a Poisson maximum likelihood. 
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The gravity equation (GE) has been a strong work horse in explaining the determinants of bilateral 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) flows. The importance of GE extends beyond economics. 
For example, the Journal of International Business Studies, the leading review of international 
business, has published, from 1996 to 2009, 10 articles where GE has been explicitly employed to 
analyze  FDI  flows, trade flows,  and  both trade and FDI flows.  The wider use of GE has been 
supported by theoretical and statistical contributions. This note intends to provide methodological best 
practices to the growing number of economists and international business scholars who are interested 
in the GE. 
THEORY UNDERLYING THE GRAVITY EQUATION 
There is a large literature showing that GE can be derived from a wide variety of frameworks of 
international trade, ranging from  models of complete specialization and identical consumers’ 
preferences (Anderson, 1979; Bergstrand, 1985; Deardorff, 1998) to models of product differentiation 
in a regime of monopolistic competition (Helpman,  1987) to hybrid models of different factor 
proportions and product differentiation (Bergstrand, 1989; Evenett &  Keller,  2002) to models of 
incomplete specialization and trade costs (Haveman & Hummels, 2004).
1
 Under complete specialization, each country specializes in the production of its own output 
while consumers purchase the output of each country according to identical preferences. Furthermore, 
trade occurs without any friction of transport costs, tariffs or tariff-equivalent border obstacles. This 
idealized set-up serves the purpose of creating a benchmark of maximum trade flows given by the 
following equation: 
  
 (1)          W j i ij Y Y Y X / = , 
where Xij denotes exports of country i to country j, Yi= i’s income, Yj= j’s income, and Yw= world 
income. Now, introduce trade costs --a collection of costs that includes transaction, transport, and 
border-related costs-- such that exports are valued at FOB prices in country i but at CIF prices in 
country j.
2 Equation (1) becomes: 3 
 
(2)          ) /( W ij j i ij Y t Y Y X = . 
where tij= one plus trade costs per unit of exports. Recall that trade costs are largely unobservable; the 
usual practice has been to proxy these costs by the geographical distance between  two country-
partners. 
In models of monopolistic competition and increasing returns to scale (Helpman & Krugman, 
1985), consumers like varieties and firms respond by differentiating their products by investing in a 
brand name. Separate markets develop for each of the differentiated products with the producer 
gaining some monopolistic power and an ability to exploit economies of scale. As countries develop 
and mature, the demand for varieties increases and international trade tends to occur within the same 
industry. In this world, Xij responds positively not only to level of aggregate income but also to the 
degree of income similarity between country–partners (Helpman, 1987). 
  Models of complete specialization predict that a producer of a given good will supply all 
consumers or all countries. In fact, the bilateral trade matrix has zeros and, consequently, the 
foundation upon which complete specialization is based may be a bit shaky (Haveman & Hummels, 
2004). Within the alternative perspective of incomplete specialization, Evenett and Keller (2002) start 
from a restricted Hecksher-Ohlin set-up of two goods, two factors, and two countries, and arrive to the 
following GE: 
(3)          ) / /( ) ( W j i j i ij Y Y Y b b X − = , 
where b defines the share of one of the two goods in total production. Say b defines the share of the 
capital-intensive good and country i is relatively rich in capital, then bi > bj and exports of the capital-
intensive good go from i to j. For the labor-intensive good, the shares are (1  -  bi) and (1 -  bj), 
respectively; exports of the labor-intensive good flow from j to i. As the factors converge in the two 
countries, bi and bj become more equal and bilateral trade peters out.  
   A recent important advancement in the GE has been proposed by Anderson and van Wincoop 
(2003), who argue that bilateral trade flows depend also on what goes on between a given country-
pair and the rest of the world; in other words, bilateral trade flows are determined in a general 
equilibrium framework. These authors derive the following GE:  4 
 
(4)         
σ − =
1 ) / ( / j i ij W j i ij P P t Y Y Y X , 
where the new variable P denotes multilateral trade costs and the coefficient σ is the elasticity of 
substitution coefficient. For σ > 1, bilateral trade flows rise (fall) if multilateral trade costs rise (fall) 
relative to bilateral trade costs. Pi and Pj are a function of all tij pairs, countries’ income shares, 
countries’ price levels, and factors unobservable to researchers. Just as importantly, they are jointly 
determined and their omission creates a bias in the estimated coefficients. We will return to this 
critical issue later. 
International business scholars have also used the GE extensively on their favorite topic of the 
determinants of FDI flows,  see, for example, Hejazi and Pauly (2005), Buckley et al.  (2007), 
Clougherty and Grajek (2008), Li and Vashchilko (2009), and others. Yet, as Li and Vashchilko 
(2009: 8) state, “the gravity model of FDI does not have as strong a theoretical foundation as in the 
case of trade…” On the other hand, the state of the art is in rapid evolution. We briefly review three 
articles. The first is by Brainard (1997) who seeks to explain the equilibrium outcome that foreign 
markets can be served either by exports or by sales of foreign affiliates of horizontally-expanded 
MNCs. In equilibrium, the share of total sales in the foreign market accounted for by exports as 
opposed to affiliates’ sales is greater when transport costs and trade barriers are lower and the fixed 
cost of setting up a foreign plant is higher. Brainard tests, with some degree of success, a GE of export 
shares being a negative function of freight cost, tariffs, home taxes, and FDI openness, and a positive 
function of the differential per-worker GDP (capturing factor-proportion differences), and trade 
openness in the host country.  
The second is by Egger and Pfaffermayr (2004) who bring to center stage the nature of the 
foreign affiliate. The theoretically expected effect of distance --proxying for differences in cultural, 
economic and political environments--  on exports and outward FDI depend not only on  the 
importance of distance for FDI relative to exports but also on whether the MNC expands horizontally 
(produce and sell in the host country) or vertically (produce in the host country and sell in the home 
country, or vice versa, through intra-firm trade).
3 The comparative statics of the authors’ three-factor 
model yield predictions for income, size similarity, relative capital endowment, relative human capital 5 
 
endowment, relative labor endowment, and distance. Distance acts negatively on trade and positively 
on horizontal and vertical MNCs when it has a low impact on new plants relative to exports. When 
this relative impact of distance is instead high, the signs of the distance coefficients on the GE for 
exports and outward FDI are reversed in the case of horizontal MNCs, whereas they are both positive 
for exports and outward FDI in the case of vertical MNCs.  
The third is by Kleinert and Toubal (2010) who demonstrate that the GE applied to affiliates’ 
sales can be derived from three different models. The first is an extension of Brainard’s (1997) and 
leads to a GE in which affiliates’ sales are a positive function of Yi, Yj and Pj and a negative function 
of distance. Both income elasticities are constrained to unity just like in the trade GE. The second 
features heterogeneous firms and fixed costs of setting a foreign plant that increase with distance. This 
set-up leads to a GE of the same form of the first model. In both first and second model the MNC 
operates horizontally. The third model is based on factor-proportion and vertical MNCs. The derived 
GE in log-linear form includes, in addition to Yi, Yj and distance, the sum of the two incomes and 
relative factor endowments. Affiliates’ sales respond with a unit elasticity to the sum of the two 
incomes, positively to Yj and relative factor endowments, and negatively to Yi and distance.  
  In sum, the trade GE has a longer history and deeper theoretical underpinnings than the FDI 
GE, but recent developments have reduced the gap between the two. Clearly, more work is needed in 
this area. 
ESTIMATION ISSUES 
We consider four key econometric issues that the literature has raised with respect to the GE 
estimation. We organize our discussion around the following testable equation for panel studies:  
(5)       . ln ln ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( ) ln( 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 ijt t j i ijt ij jt it ijt u P P CC d Y Y X + + + + + + + + = α α α α α α α α   
The new terms are as follows: d is the cost-increasing distance; CC is a vector of dummy variables 
capturing cost-reducing affinities shared by country-pairs; αt is a time effect common to all country- 
pairs; and uijt= xi + xj + μij + εijt, where xi and xj are respectively exporter and importer time-invariant 
fixed effects (FE), μij is time-invariant country-pair random effects (RE), and εijt is the residual error 
term; more on this below.  6 
 
  The first econometric issue arises from the fact that the multilateral resistance (MR) factors 
(Pi and Pj) are unobservable. Hence, these Ps become imbedded in the regression’s error term, while 
being correlated with the included variables in (5); see Anderson and van Wincoop (2003: equation 
21). Given that the error term is no longer independent of the regressors, the estimates of (5) are 
biased. Anderson and van Wincoop correct for this bias by estimating “n” non-linear equations. The 
procedure is very cumbersome and applicable when “n” is very small. Baldwin and Taglioni (2007) 
have proposed using time-varying FE, xit and xjt, and time-invariant FE, μij, for panel data, since the 
first two remove the time-series correlation and the third the cross-sectional correlation. But this 
alternative has three drawbacks. The first is that the number of country dummies is unmanageable 
(11,900 for 100 countries and 10 years). The second is that serial correlation is only partially removed 
by μij; nor can one utilize time-varying μijt because the number of country dummies would catch up 
with the sample size. The third is that  even though μij  FE could yield unbiased estimates, the 
researcher would not be able to estimate the impact of important time-invariant variables (distance, 
RTA etc.) on X. For this reason, Carrère (2006, 231) proposes that μij be treated as RE. Our conclusion 
is that the best practical solution to the MR problem is the specification given in (5); see Fratianni and 
Marchionne (2008) and Fratianni and Oh (2009).  
  The GE regressors  --our second econometric issue--  can be correlated also with other 
unobservables, such as cultural and historical affinities, that may influence the propensity of country-
pairs to trade. If omitted, these variables will be captured by the error term, which, in turn, will be 
correlated with income and RTAs (Baier & Bergstrand, 2007). Carrère (2006: 232) corrects for this 
bias by using the Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable technique.  
  The third issue deals with the serial correlation properties of the variables that enter the GE. 
Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk (2010) make the point that the GE applied on panel data may be subject to 
biased estimates because trade and FDI flows and explanatory variables like income are statistically 
non-stationary and potentially co-integrated; if co-integration cannot be rejected, then the GE must 
either be estimated in first  differences or as a Vector-Error Correction Model (VECM). For the 
authors, the VECM method is to be preferred to the first-differenced GE because it is consistent with 
the theories underlying the GE. 7 
 
The fourth and final issue tackles the GE specification form, namely whether a nonlinear GE 
is superior to a log-linear GE. Santos-Silva and Tenreyro (2006) argue that a specification like (5) 
presents two problems. The first is that the variance of error term depends on the values of the 
regressors, implying that its expected value will also depend on the regressors. The second is that the 
presence of ‘0’ in trade and FDI data and the fact that the log of zero is undefined make the data 
sample not randomly drawn. The authors recommend that the GE be estimated with a Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood. 
BEST PRACTICE 
In this section we estimate a parsimonious equation (5) for trade and FDI flows and focus on those 
best econometric practices discussed in the previous section. We use yearly bilateral trade for 177 
countries and outward FDI flows from 30 OECD countries to 30 OECD countries and 102 non-OECD 
countries; both datasets cover the period 1985-2005. World Trade Analyzer by Statistics Canada is the 
source of trade data; the International Direct Investment Statistics by OECD is the source of FDI data. 
FDI data explicitly distinguish between zero and missing values. Since '0' may also mean that FDI is 
too small to record (the observation unit is $1,000,000), truncation is a potential statistical issue. Our 
FDI dataset consists of 15,518 non-zero observations and 9,770 zero-values. Trade data do not permit 
this distinction. A ‘0’ was entered in the trade data when a country-pair had FDI, otherwise the 
observation was considered missing. Trade data truncation is less  problematic than FDI data 
truncation because the observation unit is $1,000. Our trade dataset consists of 199,129 non-zero 
observations and 12,429 zero-values. Our independent variables include nominal incomes, geographic 
distance, cultural affinities captured by common language and shared land border (adjacency), and 
institutional affinities captured by RTAs.
4
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 Here] 
 Estimates for export flows are shown in Table 1 and those 
for outward FDI in Table 2. 
Column one of the two tables tests (5) for year-FE, a common practice in panel studies. The 
regression explains 62% of the variance of trade and 47% of the variance of FDI. All coefficients have 
the expected signs, except for adjacency in the FDI regression, and are statistically significant at the 
1% level. Column two adds country-FE; for example, see Clougherty and Grajek (2008) and Cuervo-8 
 
Cazurra (2008). This regression explains 14% more of the trade variance (42% of FDI) than 
regression one. Income and distance elasticities decline; the impact of RTA falls in the trade equation 
and becomes marginally significant in the FDI equation. Column three uses year-FE and country-pair 
RE to capture cross-sectional variation. The log-likelihood improves with respect to columns one and 
two. Column four combines FE of column two with RE of column three and represents our best 
practice to solve the MR problem. We call it multilateral-RE. The log-likelihood improves further; in 
the trade equation all coefficients are strongly significant, whereas in the FDI equation adjacency and 
RTA are not.  
  Column five checks for endogeneity of RTA formation and income (Carrère, 2006) by using 
the Hausman-Taylor instrumental variable technique. The inference from the Hausman-Taylor test 
suggests no substantial difference with respect to the multilateral-RE specification.  The latter appears 
to be robust with respect to other potential endogeneity biases. 
  Columns six and seven deal with the implications of non-stationary time series. We follow 
Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk’s VECM two-step procedure. In the first step, exports or FDI are regressed 
on the co-integrated incomes, and in the second step the residuals from the first step are regressed on 
the co-integrated equation, including MR factors. Again, we find no substantive difference between 
the multilateral-RE specification and the VECM specification.  
  The last column of the two tables deals with the zero-value problem. We recall that zeros are 




 In the FDI Poisson estimation, all coefficients are statistically  highly 
significant, with adjacency and RTA now showing quantitative effects not different from those in the 
trade equation. In the trade Poisson estimation, the coefficients are not substantively different from 
those of the trade multilateral-RE, except for a lower distance elasticity, a result that accords with 
Santos-Silva and Tenreyro’s (2006). In sum, the Poisson estimation appears to correct for the 




This note has discussed theoretical and statistical issues that are of direct concern to economists and 
international business scholars who apply GE in their research. We have suggested best practices 
that emanate from recent theoretical and empirical developments and can be summarized as 
follows: use country and year fixed effects with country-pair random effects regression 
estimation in the absence of significant zero-values in the dataset; use a Poisson pseudo-
maximum likelihood estimation with country and year fixed effects and country-pair random 
effects in the presence of large number of zero-values in the dataset. Apart from the zero-value 
problem, the most important  methodological  message  of this note  is that  GE should correct for 
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Table 1 Trade GE: Exports 
 










VECM   Poisson 
(8)  Step1 (6)  Step2 (7) 
Importer’s GDP  0.829***  0.486***  0.760***  0.557***  0.568***  0.796***     0.552*** 
Exporter’s GDP  1.005***  0.482***  0.918***  0.498***  0.503***  0.953***     0.584*** 
Distance  -1.032***  -1.369***  -1.087***  -1.356***  -1.359***     -1.363***  -0.981*** 
Common Language  0.681***  0.691***  0.626***  0.679***  0.734***     0.681***  0.449*** 
Common Border  0.359***  0.271***  0.615***  0.525***  0.461***     0.524***  0.538*** 
RTA  1.220***  0.310***  0.400***  0.177***  0.116***     0.147***  0.254*** 
Year-FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Importer & Exporter-FE  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Country-Pair Effects  No  No  RE  RE  RE  No  RE  RE 
Constant  -27.08***  1.609  -23.25***  -1.034  -1.761**  -33.35***  12.23***  -10.69*** 
Over-Dispersion                       1.206*** 
Observations  199,129  199,129  199,129  199,129  199,129  199,129  199,129  211,621 
Pair Numbers        15,862  15,862  15,862     15,862  17,186 
R-Square  0.617  0.703  0.614  0.699  0.702  0.525  0.169  0.003 
Log-Likelihood  -424,131  -398,875  -368,217  -364,034     -445,619  -364,663  -2.1x10
10  
LR-Test vs. One-Way    50511     120,193        118,935    
    (0.000)     (0.000)        (0.000)    
LR-Test vs. Three-Way           69,682             
           (0.000)             
BPLM-Test        369,993  206,118        204,840    
        (0.000)  (0.000)        (0.000)    
Note: p-values in parenthesis. LR is the Likelihood ratio. BPLM is ther Breusch-Pagan Lagrange multiplier. Robust standard errors clustered by pair method 







Table 2 FDI GE: Outward FDI 
 










VECM   Poisson 
(8)  Step1 (6)  Step2 (7) 
Importer’s GDP  0.715***  0.328**  0.806***  0.749***  0.807***  0.647***     1.021*** 
Exporter’s GDP  0.705***  0.437***  0.662***  0.572***  0.607***  0.734***     0.544*** 
Distance  -0.474***  -0.960***  -0.591***  -1.082***  -1.061***     -1.083***  -1.379*** 
Common Language  1.568***  0.826***  1.612***  0.753***  0.796***     0.755***  1.571*** 
Common Border  0.106  -0.0496  0.375*  0.117  0.0458     0.115  0.680*** 
RTA  0.880***  0.164*  0.265***  0.0843  0.0517     0.0808  0.281*** 
Year-FE  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Importer & Exporter-FE  No  Yes  No  Yes  Yes  No  Yes  Yes 
Country-Pair Effects  No  No  RE  RE  RE  No  RE  RE 
Constant  -30.47***  -5.740  -31.64***  -20.86***  -23.70***  -32.74***  10.12***  -25.49*** 
Over-Dispersion                       0.915*** 
Observations  15,518  15,518  15,518  15,518  15,518  15,518  15,518  25,288 
Pair Numbers        2,152  2,152  2,152     2,152  3,589 
R-Square  0.469  0.670  0.452  0.659  0.666  0.364  0.305  0.041 
Log-Likelihood  -32,718  -29,026  -28,024  -27,184     -34,125  -27,189  -4,735,000  
LR-Test vs. One-Way     7382     11,067        11,058    
     (0.000)     (0.000)        (0.000)    
LR-Test vs. Three-Way           3,685        3,676    
           (0.000)        (0.000)    
BPLM-Test        17,877  5,485        5,536    
        (0.000)  (0.000)        (0.000)    





                                                 
1 On these developments, see Fratianni (2009). 
2 FOB price is the general free-alongside-ship export price; CIF is the pre-tariff or water’s edge price 
of delivering a product to the importing country’s entry (Eden & Rodriquez, 2004). 
3 For theories of horizontal and vertical MNC, see Helpman (1984), Markusen (1984), and Markusen 
and Venables (1998). 
4 See Fratianni and Oh (2009) for a definition of the RTAs. 
5 A word of caution: a Poisson estimation presents its own difficulties, such as incompatibility with 
many dummies, convergence,  over-dispersion, and sensitivity to initial conditions.  